نيچه
*از كسى كه كتابخانه دارد و كتاب هاى زيادى مى خواند نبايد هراسيد اما از كسى بايد ترسيد كه تنها يك كتاب دارد وآن را مقدس مى پندارد. نيچه
*باید نگاه کنید چه کسی و چه چیزی را دوست دارید تا بفهمید خودتان چه کسی هستید. معشوق شناسی راه خود شناسی است. نیچه
*فرد برتر همیشه در اقلیت است. ما باید در فرهنگ خود زمینه ای را برای ظهور نابغه فراهم کنیم در هر زمینه ای که باشد. فرهنگ با نابغه هایش شناخته میشود. نیچه
*زندگی بعضی كسان پس از مرگشان آغازمی‌شود. نیچه
كتاب فلسفه هنر نيچه - جوليان يانگ
*نياز است كه شخص خود را همچون قهرمان ادبی ((خلق كند))تا زندگی خويش را همچون اثری ادبی نظاره كند.
*با برگرداندن توجه خود از هنر به زندگی ، چگونه اين امر شيوه ای از زندگی ارائه می دهد كه قابليت غلبه بر بد بينی را دارد؟به اعتقاد من چيزی كه ارائه می شود نظرگاهی است كه در ان فرد راغب می شود كه زندگی را ((دهشتناك اما باشكوه))توصيف كند.(يكی از تصاوير نيچه از وجود انسانی ،تصويری كه به آن باز خواهيم گشت ، مار ا با سربازانی در ميدان نبردی با شكوه و زيبا در يك تابلوی نقاشی رنگ روغن مقايسه می كند.انسان شايد به ياد تابلوی نبرد سن رومانوی اوچلو بيافتد.)
چنين نظر گاهی گر چه از قبول اينكه هكتور از سرنوشتی فجيع در دستان آشيل رنج برد دريغ نمی ورزد اما با اين وجود بر زيبايی قهرمانان، نيرومنديشان، دليری و برق زره هايشان و((منش)) ا»ها تأكيد می ورزد.بدين ترتيب هومر برای قهرمانانش همان كار را می كند كه حماسه ی (متآسفانه رو به زوال ) مدرن –وسترن-برای قهرمان های خود.يك جزء لازم اين نظرگاه ، به باور من، (همانند وسترن) عدم حساسيت به حقيقت درونی رنج انسان است:برای اين كه هراس های جنگاوری هومری لذت شخص از منش و خرامش والای آن را منقص نسازد ، شخص بايد از همدردی و تشخيص رنج های قربانی های آن خود داری كند.اين همان چيزی است كه به باور نيچه در نگره ی آپولونی رخ می دهد:او می گويد كه ((آيينه نمود))از ((يكی شدن و درآميختن))هنرمند آپولونی با ((پيكره ها و صورت ها ی )) خود جلوگيری میكند.گويا ما چنان خيره زيبايی پيكره ها و صورت های هومری گشته ايم كه قادر به ديدن رنج آنها نيستيم .نگره ی آپولونی با نوعی بيرون نگری ، سطحی نگری ژرف و پرمعنی شاخص می شود.
هر قومی –و درست به همان شكل هر فردی – تنها تا اندازه ای ارزش دارد كه بتواند مهر ابديت را بر تجارب خود بكوبد؛زيرا به اين ترتيب گويی غير دنيوی شده.
*بايد از ياد نبريم كه ما افراد نه آفريننده ی جهان كه ((تنها تصاوير و فرافكنی هنرمندانه آن نگارنده راستينيم، و والا ترين شدن ما در اهميت مان به عنوان آثار هنری {او}است)). ما شبيه سربازانی هستيم كه بر بوم نقاشی يك صحنه ی نبرد نقش خورده اند. و اعتراض ما بر اينكه جهان بايستی با ما مهربان تر باشد به اندازه ی اعتراض آنان خنده آور است.
از اين رو جهان همچون پديدار زيبايی شناسانه ابژه ی لذت، زيبا، ((موجه)) و پذيرفتنی است. اما اين ابژه برای چه كسی موجه شده است؟ آشكارا نه برای افراد انسانی بلكه برای خالق جهان...و اگر اشاره ی ديگری باشد{بمانند} اين خواهد بود كه ادعا كنيم همانطور كه فرمانده ی ديگر آزار (يا شايد تنها ديوانه و سرخوش) يك بازداشتگاه اسرای آنها را همچون يك ((سرگرمی لذت بخش برای خود توجيه می كند پس اسرا نيز بايد آنرا موجه بيابند، اگر تبيين نيچه از تـأثير تراژيك درست باشد، موجودات انسانی اگر بخت يارشان باشد، می توانند برای لحظه ای از نقش بازيگر تراژدی زندگی بيرون آمده به نقش((يكتا نگارنده و تماشاگر)) آن درآيند.
*لذت لوده وارِ هستی ِ كودكانه ی جاودانِ خود به عنوان آفريدگار – تماشاگر تقدير حشراتی به نام انسان.
*((وقت گذارانی متفكرانه))
{مثل وقت گذرانی درمسابقه فوتبال برای گل نخوردن يا مثل شطرنج:جمال}
*نابغه پرستی
*يادداشت های بتهون نمايانگر جهد وكوشش او در جهت مرتب سازی ، سواسازی ، دور اندازی و تغيير و تبديل هستند كه به وسيله ی آنها يك ملودی درخشان و ظاهرا بی تكلف از ميان توده ای عظيم از مواد خام خوب ، بد و ممتنع به ثمر می نشيند. الهام ، در واقع ، كوشش و ممارست است.شرايط و ملزومات هنر عبارتند از انرژی ((پايان ناپذير ))،جد و جهد ، شهامت ، تحصيلات ، سليقه و قوه ی تشخيص و نيز ، از برخی لحاظ ، بسط دادنی قانونمند.
*خلاقيت هنری پديده ای اين جهانی وروال مند، پديده ای انسانی (بسی انسانی )است كه توسط هنرمند –شعبده باز به غلط همچون چيزی‌سرشار از طنين های فرا طبيعی جلوه داده شده است.
*((الهی ناميدن يك چيز بدين معناست :نيازی به تلاش برای رقابت با آن نداريم)):به بيان گوته ، به ستاره ها كسی چشم طمع نمی دوزد .
* تنها چيزی كه پيش بينی پذير بودن طبيعت در پی دارد اين است كه رنج های‌آينده ، از نظر امكان وقوع يا زمان وقوع،مانند مرگ و خراج قابل پيش بينی هستند و به هيچ وجه قابل حذف بودن آنها نتيجه نمی شود.
*(( سه چهارم آثار هنری عرف و قراردادند ،و اين مطلب در مورد تمام هنرمندان يونانی كه به دام ميل مفرط مدرن به نوآوری گرفتار نبودند صدق می كند.آنها از عرف پروايی نداشتند؛و به همين دليل با عامه مردم متحد بودند چرا كه عرف ها ابزار آزمون پس داده ی هنريند، زبان مشتركی كه با زحمت و مرارت به دست آمده است و به وسيله ی آن هنرمند می تواند به درستی با ادراك مخاطب خود ارتباط برقراركند.به خصوص زمانی كه هنرمند، مانند شاعران و موسيقی دان های يونانی ،توسط هر اثر خود خواستار غلبه بی درنك بر اذهان است(چون معمولا بايد با يك يا چند رقيب رقابت كند)،نخستين شرط اين است كه بی درنگ فهميده شود:كه البته اين مهم تنها از طريق عرف ميسراست...اين يك اصل كلی است كه اثر مبتكرانه ستوده و حتی گاهی اوقات پرستش می شود اما به ندرت فهميده می شود.پس ميل مفرط مدرن به ابتكار نشانگر چيست؟))
شايد پاسخ نيچه اين باشد كه اين ميل مفرط نشانگر عدم لياقت قرار است هنرمند((مدرن))برای عهده دار شدن نقش نشانگری آينده است. زيرا اگر قرار است هنرمندی حسادت و هم چشمی را بر انگيزد ، اگر مانند شاعران يونان بناست((آموزگار بزرگسالان))شود، بی شك بايد به راحتی فهميده شود.
*فيلسوف كه با ((اراده ی معطوف به حقيقت))، ((نجابت))و ((وجدان فكری))از((عوام)) متمايز می شودمحكوم است تا ((وجدان شرير)) عصر خويش باشد.يعنی او محكوم است ، مرهم مسكن های مجازی اين عصر را برداشته و زخم ها را در معرض دقيق ترين معاينات قرار دهد.مردم معمولی ، مردمی كه رهائی از شك و وسواس درمورد حقيقت و دليل می باشند، به آن چه آرامش بخش تر است ايمان می آورند تا آنچه حقيقت دارد و بی هيچ پروايی آرامشی را كه ايمان به مذهب ، هنر يا علم با خود به ارمغان می آورد می پذيرند.
*ما بايد هنرمندانی شويم كه نه ((آثار هنری ))بلكه زندگی خود را می آفرينند. ما بايد هنر ((به روي صحنه بردن خود))را فراگيريم ما بايد به ((شاعرزندگی خود))بدل گرديم.
*اولين جنبه اين ايده ی ضد دلفی است كه ((خود )) چيزی است كه شخص آن ((می شود))،يعنی شخص آن را می سازد يا می آفريند تا اينكه آن را كشف كند.واين موضع مبنايی نيچه ی متأخر است كه هيچ خود واقعی و از پيش موجودی وجود ندارد كه به انتظار كشف شدن باشد،نه خودی كه به عنوان ابژه ی ماندگار دكارتی تصور می شود-((اتم باوری روحی ...كه روح را چيزی نابود نشدنی ، جاودانه و ناگسستنی ، چيزی همچون يك موناد ، يك اتم می انگارد،بايد از دايره ی علم بيرون انداخت)).
*ما بايد هر اتفاقی را كه برايمان رخ داده است هميشه به نفع خود بدانيم.گويی زندگی چيزی جز اين نمی خواهد كه هر روز و هر ساعت اين را برما دوباره و دوباره ثابت كند.همه چيز، هوای خوب يا بد، از دست دادن دوستی ، بيماری ، بهتان ، نرسيدن نامه ای ، رگ به رگ شدگی قوزك پا ، نگاهی آنی‌به مغازه ای ، استدلالی مخالف شما، باز شدن كتابی ، يك رؤيا، يك فريب-همه و همه بلافاصله يا پس از كوتاه زمانی نشان می دهند كه اين همه ((بی جهت نبوده است)):
*شيوه ی ديگری كه تنها به كار توجيه يك پديده ، اما پديده ای بسيار مهم، به نام مرگ می آيد آن است كه وقوع مرگ را در زمانی مشخص لازمه ی خوشايندی زندگی يك شخص بدانيم همان گونه كه منطق درونی يك نمايشنامه يا يك قطعه ی موسيقی حكم می كندكه در نقطه ای مشخص پايان پذيرد.درباره ی ((مرگ خود خواسته ))زرتشت توصيه می كند:((در زمانش بمير!))می گويد شخص بايد ((آن زمان كه بهترين مزه ها را دارد مگذارد تا او را تمام بخورند))و نيز نبايد همانند سيب معرفت ديرزمانی به شاخه آويزان باشد.
*ميرابواست كه دشنام ها و تو سری های ديگران به يادش نمی ماند و هرگز نمی بخشيدشان، بلكه فراموش شان می كرد.
*اين موضوع كه هنرمندان با معيارهای ما معمولا ((بيمار)) هستند،در اراده معطوف به قدرت نه انتقادی از هنرمند بلكه انتقادی از معيار ما برای تشخيص سلامت انگاشته شده است.
*((حالت زيبايی شناسانه))نمی تواند در انسانهای ((محافظه كار، ملال آور ، فرسوده و پژمرده (به عنوان مثال دانشمندان)))پديد آيد .وادامه می دهد((آنها هيچ بهره ای از هنر نمی برند چرا كه آن جان مايه ی هنری اوليه راندارند،...)) به شكل واضحتری ادعا می كند((تأثير آثار هنری برانگيختن حالتی است كه هنر را پديد می آورد.))...حالتی كه ميان هنرمند و مخاطب اصيل مشترك است.
*ادعای ديگر نيچه اين است كه شناسندگان ناب نازا و عقيم هستند. آنها نه همچون ((آفرينندگان))ونه همچون خورشيد بلكه به سان ماه ((به زمين عشق می ورزند)):آنها هيچ گاه((نمی آفرينند)).نيچه ادامه می دهد تصور اين كه چشم چرانی عقيم آنها تنها تجربه شان از زيبايی است خنده آور است.
*((بهتر بود پروفسور دانشگاه باسل می ماندم و خدا نمی شدم ، اما نمی توانستم آن قدر خود خواه باشم كه به خاطر آن ازآفريدن جهان غافل شوم)).
*((خدای كهن استعفا داده است ، به زودی من برجهان حكم خواهم راند))
*وظيفه ی هر فرد، كشف آن منش و سبك مختص به اوست .اما در نزد نيچه ، چنانكه خواهيم ديد، چنين منشی را تنها بايد آفريد و آن را با دستان خود خلق كرد.
*هنرمند مثل خطيب (1)در حالت ذهنی خاصی است كه می خواهد آن را به ديگری منتقل كند، (2)ابزار مناسبی برای اين ارتباط خلق كرده و برمی گزيند كه خوشبختانه(3)در باز آفرينی حالت ذهنی مشابه ای در مخاطب موفق عمل می كند.
Beyond good and evil
67. Love to one only is a barbarity, for it is exercised at the
expense of all others. Love to God also!
69. One has regarded life carelessly, if one has failed to see the hand that--kills with leniency.
71. THE SAGE AS ASTRONOMER.--So long as thou feelest the stars as an "above thee," thou lackest the eye of the discerning one.
72. It is not the strength, but the duration of great sentiments that makes great men.
73A. Many a peacock hides his tail from every eye--and calls it his pride.
74. A man of genius is unbearable, unless he possess at least two things besides: gratitude and purity.
76. Under peaceful conditions the militant man attacks himself.
77. With his principles a man seeks either to dominate, or justify, or honour, or reproach, or conceal his habits
80. A thing that is explained ceases to concern us
81. It is terrible to die of thirst at sea. Is it necessary that you should so salt your truth that it will no longer—quench thirst?
85. The same emotions are in man and woman, but in different TEMPO, on that account man and woman never cease to misunderstand each other.
86. In the background of all their personal vanity, women
themselves have still their impersonal scorn--for "woman".
87. FETTERED HEART, FREE SPIRIT--When one firmly fetters one's heart and keeps it prisoner, one can allow one's spirit many liberties:
136. The one seeks an accoucheur for his thoughts, the other seeks some one whom he can assist: a good conversation thus originates.
146. He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.
151. It is not enough to possess a talent: one must also have your permission to possess it;--eh, my friends?
158. Not only our reason, but also our conscience, truckles to our strongest impulse--the tyrant in us.
162. "Our fellow-creature is not our neighbour, but our
neighbour's neighbour":--so thinks every nation.
169. To talk much about oneself may also be a means of concealing oneself.
179. The consequences of our actions seize us by the forelock, very indifferent to the fact that we have meanwhile "reformed."
183. "I am affected, not because you have deceived me,but because I can no longer believe in you."
113. "You want to prepossess him in your favour? Then you must be embarrassed before him."
117. The will to overcome an emotion, is ultimately only the will of another, or of several other, emotions.
119. Our loathing of dirt may be so great as to prevent our cleaning ourselves--"justifying" ourselves.
124. He who exults at the stake, does not triumph over pain, but because of the fact that he does not feel pain where he expected it. A parable.
*. As regards a woman, for instance, the control over her body and her sexual gratification serves as an amply sufficient sign of ownership and possession to the more modest man; another with a more suspicious and ambitious thirst for possession, sees the "questionableness," the mere apparentness of such ownership, and wishes to have finer tests in order to know especially whether the woman not only gives herself to him, but also gives up for his sake what she has or would like to have-- only THEN does he look upon her as "possessed." A third, however, has not even here got to the limit of his distrust and his desire for possession: he asks himself whether the woman, when she gives up everything for him, does not perhaps do so for a phantom of him; he wishes first to be thoroughly, indeed, profoundly well known; in order to be loved at all he ventures to let himself be found out. Only then does he feel the beloved one fully in his possession, when she no longer deceives herself about him, when she loves him just as much for the sake of his devilry and concealed insatiability, as for his goodness, patience, and spirituality. One man would like to possess a nation, and he finds all the higher arts of Cagliostro and Catalina suitable for his purpose. Another, with a more refined thirst for possession, says to himself: "One may not deceive where one desires to possess"--he is irritated and impatient at the idea that a mask of him should rule in the hearts of the people: "I must, therefore, MAKE myself known, and first of all learn to know myself!" Among helpful and charitable people, one almost always finds the awkward craftiness which first gets up suitably him who has to be helped, as though, for instance, he should "merit" help, seek just THEIR help, and would show himself deeply grateful, attached, and subservient to them for all help. With these conceits, they take control of the needy as a property, just as in general they are charitable and helpful out of a desire for property. One finds them jealous when they are crossed or forestalled in their charity. Parents involuntarily make something like themselves out of their children--they call that "education"; no mother doubts at the bottom of her heart that the child she has borne is thereby her property, no father hesitates about his right to HIS OWN ideas and notions of worth. Indeed, in former times fathers deemed it right to use their discretion concerning the life or death of the newly born (as among the ancient Germans). And like the father, so also do the teacher, the class, the priest, and the prince still see in every new individual an unobjectionable opportunity for a new possession. The consequence is . . .!
After all, "love to our neighbour" is always a secondary matter, partly conventional and arbitrarily manifested in relation to our FEAR OF OUR NEIGHBOUR. After the fabric of society seems on the whole established and secured against external dangers, it is this fear of our neighbour which again creates new perspectives of moral valuation.
precisely this shall be called GREATNESS: as diversified as can be entire, as ample as can be full "To think" and to take a matter "seriously," "arduously"--that is one and the same thing to them; such only has been their "experience."-- Artists have here perhaps a finer intuition; they who know only too well that precisely when they no longer do anything "arbitrarily," and everything of necessity, their feeling of freedom, of subtlety, of power, of creatively fixing, disposing, and shaping, reaches its climax--in short, that necessity and "freedom of will" are then the same thing with them In man CREATURE and CREATOR are unitedOur honesty, we free spirits--let us be careful lest it become our vanity, our ornament and ostentation, our limitation, our stupidity! Every virtue inclines to stupidity, every stupidity to virtue; "stupid to the point of sanctity," they say in Russia
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what is fair to one MAY NOT at all be fair to another, that the requirement of one morality for all is really a detriment to higher men, in short, that there is a DISTINCTION OF RANK between man and man, and consequently between morality and morality.
*
Normal 0 false false false EN-US X-NONE FA
There is MASTER-MORALITY and SLAVE-MORALITY,--I would at once add, however, that in all higher and mixed civilizations, there are also attempts at the reconciliation of the two moralities, but one finds still oftener the confusion and mutual
misunderstanding of them, indeed sometimes their close juxtaposition--even in the same man, within one soul. The distinctions of moral values have either originated in a ruling caste, pleasantly conscious of being different from the ruled--or
among the ruled class, the slaves and dependents of all sorts. In
the first case, when it is the rulers who determine the conception "good," it is the exalted, proud disposition which is
regarded as the distinguishing feature, and that which determines the order of rank. The noble type of man separates from himself the beings in whom the opposite of this exalted, proud disposition displays itself he despises them. Let it at once be noted that in this first kind of morality the antithesis "good"
and "bad" means practically the same as "noble" and "despicable",--the antithesis "good" and "EVIL" is of a different
origin. The cowardly, the timid, the insignificant, and those thinking merely of narrow utility are despised; moreover, also,
the distrustful, with their constrained glances, the self- abasing, the dog-like kind of men who let themselves be abused, the mendicant flatterers, and above all the liars:--it is a fundamental belief of all aristocrats that the common people are untruthful. "We truthful ones"--the nobility in ancient Greece called themselves. It is obvious that everywhere the designations of moral value were at first applied to MEN; and were only derivatively and at a later period applied to ACTIONS; it is a gross mistake, therefore, when historians of morals start with questions like, "Why have sympathetic actions been praised?" The noble type of man regards HIMSELF as a determiner of values; he does not require to be approved of; he passes the judgment: "What is injurious to me is injurious in itself;" he knows that it is he himself only who confers honour on things; he is a CREATOR OF VALUES. He honours whatever he recognizes in himself: such morality equals self-glorification. In the foreground there is the feeling of plenitude, of power, which seeks to overflow, the happiness of high tension, the consciousness of a wealth which would fain give and bestow:--the noble man also helps the unfortunate, but not--or scarcely--out of pity, but rather from an impulse generated by the super-abundance of power. The noble man honours in himself the powerful one, him also who has power over himself, who knows how to speak and how to keep silence, who takes pleasure in subjecting himself to severity and hardness, and has reverence for all that is severe and hard. "Wotan placed a hard heart in my breast," says an old Scandinavian Saga: it is thus rightly expressed from the soul of a proud Viking. Such a type of man is even proud of not being made for sympathy; the hero of the Saga therefore adds warningly: "He who has not a hard heart when young, will never have one." The noble and brave who think thus are the furthest removed from the morality which sees precisely in sympathy, or in acting for the good of others, or in DESINTERESSEMENT, the characteristic of the moral; faith in oneself, pride in oneself, a radical enmity and irony towards "selflessness," belong as definitely to noble morality, as do a careless scorn and precaution in presence of sympathy and the "warm heart."--It is the powerful who KNOW how to honour, it is their art, their domain for invention. The profound reverence for age and for tradition--all law rests on this double reverence,-- the belief and prejudice in favour of ancestors and unfavorable to newcomers, is typical in the morality of the powerful; and if, reversely, men of "modern ideas" believe almost instinctively in "progress" and the "future," and are more and more lacking in respect for old age, the ignoble origin of these "ideas" has complacently betrayed itself thereby. A morality of the ruling class, however, is more especially foreign and irritating to present-day taste in the sternness of its principle that one has duties only to one's equals; that one may act towards beings of a lower rank, towards all that is foreign, just as seems good to one, or "as the heart desires," and in any case "beyond good and evil": it is here that sympathy and similar sentiments can have a place. The ability and obligation to exercise prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge--both only within the circle of equals,-- artfulness in retaliation, RAFFINEMENT of the idea in friendship, a certain necessity to have enemies (as outlets for the emotions of envy, quarrelsomeness, arrogance--in fact, in order to be a good FRIEND): all these are typical characteristics of the noble morality, which, as has been pointed out, is not the morality of "modern ideas," and is therefore at present difficult to realize, and also to unearth and disclose.--It is otherwise with the second type of morality, SLAVE-MORALITY. Supposing that the abused, the oppressed, the suffering, the unemancipated, the weary, and those uncertain of themselves should moralize, what will be the common element in their moral estimates? Probably a pessimistic suspicion with regard to the entire situation of man will find expression, perhaps a condemnation of man, together with his situation. The slave has an unfavourable eye for the virtues of the powerful; he has a skepticism and distrust, a REFINEMENT of distrust of everything "good" that is there honoured--he would fain persuade himself that the very happiness there is not genuine. On the other hand, THOSE qualities which serve to alleviate the existence of sufferers are brought into prominence and flooded with light; it is here that sympathy, the kind, helping hand, the warm heart, patience, diligence, humility, and friendliness attain to honour; for here these are the most useful qualities, and almost the only means of supporting the burden of existence. Slave-morality is essentially the morality of utility. Here is the seat of the origin of the famous antithesis "good" and "evil":--power and dangerousness are assumed to reside in the evil, a certain dreadfulness, subtlety, and strength, which do not admit of being despised. According to slave-morality, therefore, the "evil" man arouses fear; according to master-morality, it is precisely the "good" man who arouses fear and seeks to arouse it, while the bad man is regarded as the despicable being. The contrast attains its maximum when, in accordance with the logical consequences of slave-morality, a shade of depreciation--it may be slight and well-intentioned—at last attaches itself to the "good" man of this morality; because, according to the servile mode of thought, the good man must in any case be the SAFE man: he is good-natured, easily deceived, perhaps a little stupid, un bonhomme. Everywhere that slave- morality gains the ascendancy, language shows a tendency to approximate the significations of the words "good" and "stupid."- -A last fundamental difference: the desire for FREEDOM, the instinct for happiness and the refinements of the feeling of liberty belong as necessarily to slave-morals and morality, as artifice and enthusiasm in reverence and devotion are the regular symptoms of an aristocratic mode of thinking and estimating.
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